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Freezing of Terrorist Assets Giving Fundamental Rights the Cold 
Shoulder?
by Joe Stevens
his paper will examine how the UK has implemented ‘targeted’ or ‘smart’ sanctions 
designed to freeze the assets of individuals and other entities in relation to those 
suspected of being involved in terrorist activity, through implementation of various 
United Nations Security Council Resolutions (SCR’s). This article will chart the historical 
development of these UN sanctions and analyse how the UK introduced them into domestic law, 
firstly by means of secondary legislation contained in the United Nations Act 1945 and secondly 
following the decision by the UK Supreme Court in R v A (& others) [2] in the form of the Terrorist 
Asset Freezing Etc Act 2010. Both the case and the subsequent legislation and its impact will also 
be discussed. Finally the paper will consider weather this implementation has eroded fundamental 
rights within the UK’s domestic law in order to fulfil our international obligations under the UN 
charter and what if any protection, is now in place for those named under this system after 
implementation of the UK’s new asset freezing regime.
The Historical and Legal Background of UN Sanctions
Following the formation of the United Nations, member states bound themselves through the UN’s 
Charter to maintain international peace and security, to take collective measures for the prevention 
and removal of any threat to this peace and to promote and encourage respect for human rights and 
fundamental freedoms (Article 1)[3]. The United Nations Security Council (UNSC) was given 
primary responsibility for maintaining this peace and security and member states agreed through the 
charter to carry out the decisions or resolutions of the Security Council in order to achieve this end 
(Article 24).
Under Article 41 of the UN Charter, the Security Council may decide what measures not involving 
the use of armed force are to be employed to give effect to its decisions, and it may call upon the 
Members of the United Nations to apply such measures. Among a number of miscellaneous 
provisions in Chapter XVI is one of the most important articles 103, which provides;
“In the event of a conflict between the obligations of the Members of the United  Nations 
under the present Charter and their obligations under any other international agreement, 
their obligations under the present Charter shall prevail.[4]” 
“T
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Only treaty provisions that are incompatible with jus cogens, such as the prohibition on torture are 
considered void. Obligations under the decisions and enforcement measures of Chapter VII prevail 
over other commitments of the members concerned in international law[5]. 
There have of course been numerous threats to international peace and security since 1945. Various 
UNSC Resolutions have been made calling upon the members of the United Nations to take 
measures under article 41. As the Security Council's practice has evolved it has become more 
directive to what States themselves might or might not do SCR 1189[6] (1998) declared that every 
State has the duty to refrain from organizing, instigating, assisting or participating in terrorist acts in 
another state or acquiescing in organised activities within its own territory which might be directed 
towards the commission of such acts. 
In response to attacks on US embassies and other assets the Security Council directed its attention 
to the activities of the ruling regime in Afghanistan. SCR 1267(1999) provided for the freezing of 
funds and other financial resources derived from or generated from property owned or controlled by 
the Taliban and Al Qaeda. A sanctions Committee was established to oversee implementation of 
these measures, known as the 1267 Committee. SCR 1333(2000) took this process a step further, it 
provided that all states should freeze funds and other financial assets of Usama bin Laden and 
individuals and entities associated with him to ensure that no funds were made available for the 
benefit of any person or entity associated with him, including the Al-Qaida organisation. Although 
previous UN practice did not go this far, nothing in article 41 would appear to prohibit the taking of 
direct collective measures at an international level against individuals. Article 41 contains only an 
enumeration of the non-military measures that could be taken which was illustrative and non-
exhaustive[7].  
As part of its response to the attacks on the US mainland collectively known as 9/11, the Security 
Council broadened its approach to the problem still further. It decided that action now required to be 
taken against everyone who committed or attempted to commit terrorist acts or facilitated their 
commission. It adopted SCR 1373(2001) requiring states to complement international co-operation 
by taking additional measures to prevent and suppress, within their territories through all lawful 
means, the financing and preparation of any acts of terrorism. The Security Council also decided 
that all states should, among various other measures, prevent those who finance, plan, facilitate or 
commit terrorist acts from using their respective territories for those purposes against other states or 
their citizens. States were also to ensure that any person who participates in the financing, planning, 
preparation of terrorist acts or in supporting terrorist acts should be brought to justice. Provision 
was made for establishing a Committee of the Security Council, consisting of all its members, to 
monitor implementation of the Resolution, known as the 1373 Committee.
Prior to the events of 9/11, the United Kingdom Parliament had already enacted a new Terrorism 
Act in 2000 it had specifically created a criminal regime for dealing with the funding of terrorism. 
The Act provided the framework for the making of freezing orders. Further legislation in the 
Prevention of Terrorism Act 2005 provided for the making of control orders which can also affect a 
person’s finances. The Counter-Terrorism Act 2008 introduced a legislative procedure for setting 
aside financial restrictions decisions taken by the Treasury. 
In order to give direct effect to its United Nation Charter obligations in domestic law the United 
Kingdom had introduced the United Nations Act 1946[8]. This act allows the Government to 
introduce secondary legislation by making various orders in council to give effect to relevant 
SCR’s. 
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The Terrorism Order (TO)
SCR 1373 was given effect in UK domestic law by introducing the Terrorism (United Nations 
Measures) Order 2001 (SI 2001/3365), in October 2001. The wording of its leading provision was 
modelled on that of the SCR, making it a criminal offence for any person who, except under the 
authority of a licence granted by the Treasury, makes any funds, financial or related services 
available directly or indirectly to or for the benefit of a person who commits, attempts to commit, 
facilitates or participates in the commission of an acts of terrorism. It also includes those people 
who may be controlled either directly or indirectly and those who act on behalf or at the direction 
of, anyone involved in terrorism.
A lack of Parliamentary debate regarding the introduction of this major terrorist legislation is 
typical of Parliament’s response to any matter involving ‘terrorism’, which nearly always passes 
through both houses with little or no debate. Perhaps most infamously demonstrated by recalling the 
introduction of the 1911 Official Secrets Act which became law the same day it was introduced to 
Parliament, leaving the iniquitous Sec 2 on the statute books for over sixty years. 
The Terrorism (United Nations Measures) Order 2006[9] (SI 2006/2657) the (TO) was also 
introduced as an order in council under the same act. It gave effect to SCR 1373(2001) and SCR 
1452(2002), revoking the 2001 order. The new order allowed for the Treasury to give a direction as 
to who could be designated provided they are satisfied under the grounds of reasonable suspicion 
that the person is or may be, a person who commits, attempts to commit, participates in or 
facilitates the commission of acts of terrorism or merely a person identified in the Council Decision. 
The order also applies to those allegedly controlled either directly or indirectly, or acting on behalf 
of or at the direction of a designated person. Designation imparts a very onerous regime on those 
selected. No one including the designated person may deal with funds or economic resources 
belonging to, owned or held by a person referred to in the order, unless he does so under the 
authority of a licence granted by the Treasury. A person who contravenes the prohibition is guilty of 
an offence.  The phrase “deal with” in this order was written in terms which are designed to catch 
every imaginable kind of transaction in respect of funds and economic resources. The treasury may 
authorise certain transactions under a licence to. These may be general or granted to a category of 
persons or to a particular person, they may be subject to conditions and may be of indefinite 
duration or subject to an expiry date. The Treasury may vary or revoke the licence at any time. This 
gave extraordinary power to HM Treasury in respect of persons assets without that person being 
convicted charged arrested or even questioned over their alleged involvement in terrorism. 
In August 2009 the Terrorism (United Nations Measures) Order 2009[10] (SI 2009/1747), came into 
force. Like the 2001 and 2006 Terrorism Orders, to give effect to SCR 1373(2001). It revoked the 
2006 Order, but it provided that persons who had been designated under the 2006 Order were to 
remain subject to its terms until 31 August 2010, unless their designation was revoked by that date. 
There were some technical differences between the 2006 and the 2009 Orders, such as to the 
definition of dealing with an economic resource, which improved to a slight degree the difficult 
effects of the regime on spouses and other third parties who interacted with the designated person. 
The prohibitions that the 2009 Order imposed on making funds, financial services available for their 
benefit and on making economic resources available to them or for their benefit, apply only if the 
benefit that the person would obtain or is able to obtain is significant. An additional pre-condition 
for designation is that the Treasury must consider that the direction is necessary for purposes 
connected with protecting members of the public from the risk of terrorism. Subject to these minor 
adjustments, the impact of the regime on the designated person himself continued as rigorously as it  
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was under the 2006 Order, and the phrase “reasonable grounds for suspecting” in the 2006 Order 
was retained in the 2009 Order. 
The Al-Qaida and Taliban Order
The Treasury's response to the Security Council's directions that measures that were to be taken to 
deal with Al-Qaida, Usama bin Laden, the Taliban and other individuals, groups undertakings and 
entities associated with them as designated by the committee established pursuant to SCR 1267 was 
to make the Al-Qaida and Taliban (United Nations Measures) Order 2002[11] (SI 2002/111). It was 
replaced by Al-Qaida and Taliban (United Nations Measures) Order 2006[12] in November 2006. 
As in the case of the TO, this Order sets out a rigorous system of prohibitions and licences which is 
applied to persons who are designated persons for its purposes. The Treasury's may give a direction 
that a person identified in the direction is designated for the purposes of this Order, if they have 
reasonable grounds for suspecting that the person is or may be, Usama bin Laden, a person 
designated by the Sanctions Committee, a person owned controlled by a designated person or a 
person acting on behalf of or at the direction of a designated person. The Treasury were given the 
power to vary or revoke these directions at any time.
The Issues
The fundamental issue with the HM Treasury v A case was whether or not the Treasury, in effect the 
executive, were empowered by the United Nations Act to allow the introduction of both the 
Terrorism Order and the Al-Qaida Order, by Order in Council. The contention was that these Orders 
were ultra vires on three grounds. Firstly they passed into effect without Parliamentary scrutiny, 
secondly they lacked legal certainty and proportionality and thirdly there was no procedure 
available to allow any challenge to their designation on the list in the first place. From a Human 
Rights perspective it was argued that both sets of Orders were incompatible with article 8[13] 
article 1 of Protocol 1[14] of the European Convention on Human Rights. There was also a 
complaint regarding the lack of access to a court for an effective remedy[15].  
The Facts of the Ahmed Case
A, K and M are brothers with UK citizenship. In August 2007 they received letters which stated that  
under the Terrorism Order (TO) a direction had been made because the Treasury had reasonable 
grounds for suspecting that they were persons who facilitate or commit acts in the commission of 
terrorism. The restrictions they were placed under as a result of designation put a great burden on 
their wives and families, created significant mental health difficulties and ultimately have been 
blamed on the breakdown of their marriages. 
It is important to reiterate that A, K and M, have never been charged with or arrested for any 
terrorism related offence. It was until September 2007 that the Treasury provided some details about 
the factual basis for the decision to make the directions, although this was limited again due to the 
sensitive nature of some of the material
G, another appellant, was also informed in December 2006 that a direction had been made against 
him under the TO. He was not told until later that his original listing had been at the request of the 
United Kingdom. It was not until March 2007 that he was told that his listing meant that he was 
now a designated person under the AQO. 
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They all issued proceedings in the Administrative Court, seeking to set aside the directions made 
against them in pursuance of the two orders made by the Treasury. In April 2008 Collins J held that 
the TO and the AQO were ultra vires and he quashed both Orders[16]. Following an appeal by the 
treasury in October 2008 the Court of Appeal allowed the appeal in part. It held that the provisions 
of the AQO were lawful but stated that any person designated under these orders was entitled to 
seek judicial review of the merits of the decision. A, K, M and G were also given leave to appeal by 
an appeal in March 2009. The third proceedings were brought by HAY an Egyptian national, who 
also is resident in the United Kingdom. His name was added to the Consolidated List by the 1267 
Committee in September 2005. As a result he also became a designated person for the purposes of 
the AQO. Unlike G, the proposal that his name be added to the list was not made by the United 
Kingdom. It provided no information to the 1267 Committee in relation to its decision to add his 
name. Numerous attempts by Hays legal team via the FCO failed to establish which state had in fact 
designated him although it was understood not to be the UK. I fact the Foreign Secretary has made 
an application to the 1267 Committee for HAY's name to be removed from the list, as he considers 
that HAY's listing is no longer appropriate. The High Court[17] concluded that the AQO was ultra 
vires the 1946 Act. The Court held that the practical effect of the AQO was to preclude access to the 
Court for protection of what HAY contended were his basic rights. The Treasury appealed against 
this decision. In response to representations made by HAY's solicitors the Treasury amended his 
licence conditions which enable his wife to obtain welfare benefits. However despite the Home 
secretaries intervention Hay must remain subject to the AQO unless and until the 1267 Committee 
decides to remove him from the Consolidated List. 
The TO and AQO impose extremely onerous regimes, every transaction, however small, which 
involves the making of any payments or the passing of funds or economic resources whether 
directly or indirectly for the benefit of a designated person is criminalised. This affects all aspects of 
life, including the ability to move around at will by any means of private or public transport. To 
enable payments to be made for basic living expenses a system of Treasury regulated licensing has 
been created, There interpretation of the sanctions regime and of the system of licensing and the 
conditions that it gives rise to is extremely rigorous. The overall result is very burdensome on all 
the members of the designated person's family. Sir Anthony Clarke MR accepted that the orders are 
oppressive in their nature and that they are bound to have caused difficulties for the appellants and 
their families[18]. Wilson LJ said that they imposed ‘swingeing disabilities upon those who were 
designated.’[19] The House of Lords described the regime as it applied to HAY's wife as 
‘disproportionate and oppressive’. They continued that the invasion of the privacy of someone who 
was not a listed person as ‘extraordinary.’[20] 
The Judgement
The Supreme Court ruled by majority that both Orders were ultra vires, albeit on slightly different 
grounds. Lord Brown dissenting on the AQO on the grounds that the wording of the order was the 
same as the UNSCR and therefore was a direct compliance of the UNSCR which the UK was 
obliged to carry out as a member of the UN no matter what the Court felt. This meant in his opinion 
that, in the presence of a clear UN mandate, the principles governing the separation of powers and 
the protection of human rights within the UK would have had to bend before the need to fulfil UN 
Charter obligations.
The majority felt that there was no indication that Parliament had anticipated the adoption of such 
draconian measures when it enacted the 1946 Act.[21] On the contrary, the Court applied the 
“Simms principle[22]” which dictated that Parliament could only depart from fundamental rights 
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through express and unambiguous language. When the measures required by a UN Resolution 
affect the rights of an individual so profoundly there were limits to their adoption by means of 
Orders in Council under the general enabling power of the 1946 Act. 
The Court held that the TO was ultra vires by introducing a “reasonable suspicion” test, it went 
beyond the requirements of Resolution 1373 and therefore beyond what is allowed under executive 
discretion granted by the 1946 Act (Lord Rodger dissenting). Only Parliament could properly 
decide to impose more stringent measures upon individuals than provided for in a UN measure, 
(Lord Rodger agreeing). Lord Brown would have allowed “reasonable grounds for believing[23]” 
and Lord Mance suggested proof on the ‘balance of probabilities’.[24] Lord Rodger even accepted 
“reasonable suspicion” as “expedient” within section 1(1) of the 1946 Act, albeit only on a 
temporary basis pending rapid replacement by an Act of Parliament.[25] Lord Phillips suggested 
that the purpose of the Resolution extended only to freezing the assets of “criminals” and not mere 
“suspects”,[26] an argument rejected by Lord Rodger as “an impractical approach which would 
emasculate the very international system the Security Council wished to create.[27]”  
The court held that the orders went beyond their limit when even though the executive measure fell 
within the scope of a UNSC Resolution, the interference with fundamental rights was such that it 
could only be authorised by the democratically elected Parliament. In the absence of any effective 
and independent review at UN level it left no means to contest their designation. The Court did 
clarify that although Article 103 of the UN Charter displaced the applicants' ECHR rights and thus 
prevented any claim that the AQO was unlawful under the Human Rights Act, the right of access to 
a court had long been recognised in the common law as fundamental to the rule of law, and could 
only be overridden by clear Parliamentary wording. 
Restrictions upon the rights of citizens were made conditional upon the explicit seal of the 
democratic process. Lord Brown, dissenting in part, identified a “clash of conflicting 
principles”[28] on the one hand, the UK's UN Charter obligations, and on the other the Simms 
principle that human rights infractions need to be explicitly sanctioned by Parliament. Lord Brown 
concluded that, while the TO was ultra vires the 1946 Act, the AQO was not because it was 
categorically mandated by a UNSC Resolution. Lord Brown thus resolved the conflict by giving 
precedence to the UK's duty under Article 25 of the UN Charter to carry out UNSC Resolutions. 
The majority rejected such a conclusion; they felt that such restrictions upon individual rights 
always need Parliament's express consent. While Parliament can choose to legislate contrary to 
fundamental rights, it can also decide that certain measures required by a UNSC Resolution are too 
onerous to be given direct effect in the UK thorough secondary legislation. 
The Treasury reacted to the Supreme Court's judgment by publishing the Draft Terrorist Asset-
Freezing Bill 2010 and by securing the rapid passage of the Terrorist Asset-Freezing (Temporary 
Provisions) Act 2010. The latter deems all of the impugned Orders in Council under the 1946 Act to 
have been validly adopted and therefore retains in force all directions made under those Orders 
regardless of the fact that the Home Secretary wished Hays to be removed from the designated list. 
The Act expired in December 2010, and was replaced by the Terrorism Asset Freezing Etc Act 
2010.  This Act now provides a statutory basis for the UK's asset freezing regime. Under this new 
act there are two designation powers available to the treasury, final and interim. Interim 
designations are based on the lower ‘reasonable suspicion’ standard rather than the more generally 
accepted ‘reasonable belief’. Interim designations only may last up to 30 days, but can be renewed, 
while final designations based on ‘reasonable belief’ expire one year from being made unless also 
renewed.  There is a provision within the act which provides for judicial review of any Treasury 
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decision made but that is unlikely to help anyone placed on the UNs consolidated list. It would 
appear that victory of the successful applicants in the Ahmed case has proved extremely short-lived.
In December 2011 the first report into the operation of the Terrorism Freezing Etc Act 2010 was 
published.[29] The author considered the lack of funds seized and numbers of persons involved 
make this an ancillary rather than central part of the UK fight against terrorism. A positive note was 
that to incur designation now required both a necessity to protect the public and the burden of 
reasonable belief rather than reasonable suspicion. Although it was found to questionable if the 
required necessity test had been met in all cases[30]. There is a recommendation that the HM 
Treasury should be required to explain to Parliament the basis on which it considers the necessity 
test will be satisfied and that it is proportionate. The report recognises the lack of judicial input into 
designation process such as required in the use of control orders and unlike the procedure adopted 
in France and Ireland[31]. This gives wide powers to the executive and recommends that it should 
be a last option with prosecution being preferred with its inherent protections for the accused. 
Improved clarity in Treasury reports and its website is recommended to improve transparency of the 
Act as a whole. Licensing and compliance under the Act needs to be clearer in order assist those 
designated in understanding what they are and are not permitted to do[32]. There was also concern 
that the names of those designated are made public without the person being in a position to know 
the case against them or defend themselves in any way from it. The author of the report 
acknowledges many improvements over the previous regime and cooperation from the Treasury 
itself as well as a sharp decline in the number of people designated.[33]
Conclusion
This case is important for a number of reasons. On a constitutional level what started as a narrow 
interpretation of section 1 on the 1946 United Nations Act took on enormous significance. Critics 
may argue that there was a lack of consistency in the Lordships judgements and that the decision 
itself in this case is divisive, however taken overall the Court has produced a coherent view. In the 
main they suggested that to implement such measures which directly affect in such a grave manner 
an individual’s fundamental rights is a matter that should be put before Parliament and not left to 
the Executive alone. Unfortunately their reasoning that this would allow full democratic debate 
before implementation has proved imaginary. Lord Rodger in his judgement stated that it really did 
not matter by what means the SCR’s were introduced into our domestic law, as introduced they 
inevitably will be because of our international obligations under the UN Charter. Whilst ultimately 
this has have turned out to be true, perhaps he misses the point, that under the UK’s duellist system 
it should be for Parliament to discuss the ramifications to our democratic society of implementing 
international measures that have such a draconian effect on an individual’s rights. There is a danger 
that by accepting these resolutions of what Stone refers to as ‘incremental infringement’ that is, 
Parliament accepts one type of control as necessary in one area of law which may then justify its 
application to another[34]. 
This Court’s ultimate decision to find both orders ultra vires does show an attempt to protect the 
individual from excessive executive power, whilst supporting the concept of Parliamentary 
supremacy and the respect of the judiciary for the separation of those powers, contrary to much 
recent media reporting. The Government in turn has shown unwavering support for almost 
unrestricted authority of the UNSC with their innate lack of effective judicial review or democratic 
accountability. The UN is essentially a political body that has none of the inherent safeguards we 
consider necessary to protect those subject to decisions in a democracy. Surprisingly perhaps the 
ECtHR has effectively played no part in protecting an individual from the excess of any SCR, they 
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have made clear in various judgements that under article 103, the UNSC will always take precedent 
over any other international agreement. 
Whilst the primary aim of the UN is the maintenance of international peace and security, it seems 
that when doing so human rights are seen as secondary, there is a disregard for fundamental rights 
and an inherent lack of judicial protection available to those subjected to these sanctions as shown 
in A case. The view that peace and security and fundamental human rights are mutually exclusive is 
thought by some, if not all commentators to be simply untrue[35]. They argue that any lasting 
strategy for peace and security that is not anchored in respect for human rights and civil liberties is 
essentially a strategy of insecurity[36]. Whilst this is clearly only one view, it could be argued that 
whenever national or international security is threatened states should uphold human rights not 
dispose of them on the grounds they are luxuries that cannot be supported. Fundamental rights such 
as a fair trial, family life, peaceful enjoyment of possessions and an effective judicial review are 
surely equally important to a strong democratic society as are peace and security. These rights are 
clearly missing from the SCR now implemented into UK domestic law. One view is that by treating 
both security and human rights as equal, it may actually lead to a more ‘rights’ based democratic 
society, one possibly be less susceptible to cause and effect of terrorism in the first place.
The reasoning behind the sanctions imposed by the UN are of course laudable in their overall aims 
of attempting to maintain peace and security by suppressing international terrorism, one that 
operates without borders or even a substantive organisation to hold to account.  However to use 
such a blunt international instrument as UN sanctions against individuals with its real and personal 
consequences as shown in the A case is something that Parliament was unlikely to have foreseen 
when it introduced the UN Act in 1946 and one that should have perhaps been debated more 
stridently by Parliament before introducing any new asset freezing legislation. Whilst this lack of 
real debate is disappointing it is not surprising when considered in the historical context of terrorism 
debates generally within Parliament. 
Lord Rodger stated in the A case that those subjected to these measures are effectively ‘prisoners of 
the state’. As a permanent member of the Security Council it appears that the UK government has 
done little to uphold our own democratic principles within the asset freezing regime currently 
initiated by the UN. Although these sanctions are not supposed to be criminal in nature but a 
preventative civil measure,  those subjected to them, many for over ten years now, they may have 
good grounds to suggest they are in effect a punitive measure with few safeguards available under 
national law. Generally speaking the UK has a robust human rights protective mechanism in form 
of the Human Rights Act enshrining rights agreed in ECHR, however the A case and the subsequent 
implementation of the new asset freezing legislation has highlighted the vulnerability to 
interference and erosion of those rights through instigating SCR at the international level, 
something perhaps we should all be concerned about. 
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